The May 2010 Flash Crash and August 2007 Quant Meltdown raised concerns about the impact of quantitative investment strategies on market stability. Theory is split on whether quantitative investing dampens or exacerbates market instability. To test the theory we focus on mutual fund fire sales. We find that quantitative fund fire sales have a much larger impact on market instability than fire sales by traditional mutual funds. For the same magnitude fire sale, quantitative funds' impact is over five times as large. The evidence suggests this is due to quantitative funds' reliance on similar trading signals and sensitivity to the time-series of returns.
Quantitative investing is the process of making investment decisions based on systematic, rule-based criteria. Until recently quantitative investing had been contained to a subset of hedge funds. In recent years it has become increasingly mainstream and is now accessible to retail investors through quantitative mutual funds. Among the largest quantitative mutual fund managers is AQR, with over $200 billion in assets under management.
2 While mutual funds are a wellstudied segment of financial markets, little attention has been given to the rise of quantitative mutual funds. In particular, the effect that the rise in popularity of quantitative investing has on market stability remains an open question. This paper examines whether quantitative firms have a differential effect on market stability compared to traditional mutual funds.
Theory is split on how quantitative investing may impact market instability. It may benefit financial markets because quantitative managers aim to take a calculated and emotionless approach to investing, which could help to reduce inefficiencies, and therefore reduce idiosyncratic periods of market instability (Kirilenko and Lo (2013) ). Alternatively, quantitative investors may decrease market stability due to following similar strategies. If quantitative managers analyze past data in a similar fashion and come to similar conclusions about what are the optimal signals to forecast future returns they are likely to make similar trading decisions. As a result of too many quantitative investors trading on the same information the exhibit greater price pressures as they enter and exit trades which ultimately decreases stability (Falato et al. (2016) , Chaderina et al. (2018) , and Cai et al. (2019) ).
We test whether mutual fund fire sales, as defined by Coval and Stafford (2007) , behave differently for quantitative funds versus non-quantitative funds. We find that flow-induced selling by quantitative funds generate transitory price declines over five times as large as non-quantitative funds for the positions sold in their portfolios. In addition, it takes three months longer for these stocks to recover to fundamental value. The result leads naturally to the question of why is the quantitative fire sale so much more impactful. We document that quantitative mutual funds tend to have higher levels of portfolio and trading overlap, likely due to their following similar signals.
Digging further into the signal generation algorithm, we find that quantitative firms' selling decisions are more heavily influenced by peer fire sales and that recent returns are more influential for selling decisions. These behaviors may lead to a stronger negative feedback loop for quantitative firms.
We identify funds that use a quantitative investment process by performing textual analysis of mutual fund prospectuses. 3 To understand how funds typically describe their investing process we begin by reviewing the Morningstar "Investment Strategy" field for a subset of equity funds.
For example, the T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund (TRBCX) explains "It focuses on companies with leading market positions, seasoned management, and strong financial fundamentals." Whereas the Leuthold Select Industries fund (LSLTX) states "In investing in equity securities, the fund uses a disciplined, unemotional, quantitative investment approach that is based on the belief investors can achieve superior investment performance through group selection (Select Industries Strategy)."
Using our methodology the latter fund would be identified as a quantitative fund and the former as a fundamental fund. We generate a phrase list reflective of a quantitative investment
process and use this to analyze mutual fund prospectuses. We consider prospectuses on the EDGAR database for funds available to investors from 1999 to 2015. The label "Quantitative 3 As described in Section 1.1 the identification methodology is similar to Harvey et al. (2017) and Albina (2017) both of whom examine differences in quantitative versus fundamental investment management. As a robustness check, in Section 4.3 we repeat the main analysis using Harvey et al. (2017) 's identification strategy and find qualitatively similar results.
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funds" refers to those funds that the textual analysis has identified as using a quantitative investing strategy. "Non-quantitative" (or fundamental) funds are those who do not refer to the use of a quantitative investing process in their prospectus. Over the course of the sample period, we find that the total number of quantitative funds increases steadily. In 2000 we identify 109 (7%)
quantitative funds in the sample and in 2015 we find 168 (13%) quantitative funds out of 1,283 total mutual funds.
We focus the analysis on mutual funds that experience large outflows and inflows, referred to colloquially as "fire sales," and we follow Coval and Stafford (2007) in identifying these events.
We bifurcate the fire sale events based on the classification of quantitative and non-quantitative funds. Both types of funds outflows are associated with short-term negative abnormal returns.
However, the price impact on underlying securities resulting from outflows from quantitative funds is over five times as large as that for similarly sized outflows from fundamental funds.
Why is the price pressure from quantitative fund fire sales so much larger? We test three possible mechanisms: overlapping positions, momentum exposure, and cash holdings.
We first explore overlapping portfolio holdings. Greater portfolio overlap among quantitative funds would increase the likelihood that multiple funds liquidate the same securities in a fire sale. While a single fund liquidating positions may be able to adequately coordinate securities transactions in a manner to minimize market impact, multiple funds liquidating the same stocks are likely unaware of each other's trading intentions and overall liquidations would occur in a less coordinated fashion. We find that quantitative funds exhibit significantly greater portfolio overlap and selling overlap (more than double) relative to non-quantitative funds which supports the overlapping positions hypothesis.
Next we test the momentum exposure mechanism. If quantitative funds rely more heavily on past price momentum in their selling decisions, this could generate a negative feedback loop in the returns of stocks widely sold by quantitative funds undergoing fire sales. Downward price pressure generated by a single quantitative fund fire sale may generate enough negative momentum to induce other quantitative funds with the same positions to sell these securities. This downward momentum could be a further catalyst for fire sales by other funds and eventually lead to market destabilization (Stein (2012), Falato et al. (2016) , Cai et al. (2019) ). Consistent with the momentum exposure hypothesis, we find that quantitative funds are much more sensitive to recent poor returns than non-quantitative funds when deciding which stocks to sell upon suffering extreme outflows.
Finally we examine the cash holdings channel. Funds that hold lower levels of cash may need to sell more securities more aggressively in order to meet the same level of investor redemptions, potentially generating a larger effect on prices. While we find that quantitative funds tend to hold less cash than their non-quantitative counterparts, the level of cash holdings do not correlate with the magnitude of the fire sale returns. Thus, cash is not likely to play a role in contributing to the larger distortion from quantitative funds.
Together, the overlapping positions and momentum exposure hypotheses help explain why quantitative funds' price pressure from fire sales is larger than non-quantitative funds' price pressure.
This study makes two core contributions to the literature. First, it builds on the fire sale literature generally. Coval and Stafford (2007) note that selling by mutual funds receiving large outflows strains other funds and the largest outflows can cause stock prices to become distressed.
Furthermore, the fire sale stock pressure can lead to market distortions and can have a destabilizing
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3281447 effect in capital markets (Cai et al. (2019) ; Duarte and Eisenbach (2018) it results in increased diversification and reduced volatility. Kirilenko and Lo (2013) theorize that quantitative investing and its' ability to destabilize markets.
Data
This section details the investment strategy identification methodology and data sources used for the analysis.
Identifying quantitative mutual funds
To identify quantitative funds within the sample we rely on hand collected data as well as public data sources. We first examine descriptions of mutual funds' investment strategies taken from the Investment Strategy field on the Morningstar Direct database. The Investment Management field holds partial descriptions of the methods and investment strategies employed by the mutual fund and is collected from the fund's most recent SEC filing. 4 The SEC mandates 4 Morningstar Direct describes the Investment Strategy field in the following manner: "The first sentence will always be the fund's investment objective. From there, the rest of the description will be a summary of that fund's principal investment strategies as written in the prospectus -this should include first of all what a fund "normally" or "primarily" invests in, followed by what the fund "may" invest in. Additionally, it includes information about what the fund does not invest in, if applicable. Finally, if the fund is non-diversified, it will include a non-diversification 7 that all mutual funds disclose the principle investment strategy to investors. This data field is also used by Kostovetsky and Warner (2019) when evaluating innovation in the mutual fund industry.
We review the Investment Strategy by hand for a subset of domestic equity funds to generate a list of phrases (Appendix B) indicative of a quantitative investing process.
Once we established our list of identifying phrases, we deploy an algorithm to scan summary prospectuses on the SEC's EDGAR database to determine if funds incorporate quantitative aspects into their portfolio management process. The algorithm examines the full text of the prospectus for the presence of one or more of the phrases on our list. We scan the entire prospectus because the Morningstar data field contains only partial information from the prospectus. This lack of information necessitates our collecting of information from the EDGAR database. We search all prospectuses on the EDGAR database from 1999 until 2015
For the period from 2009 until 2015 we use the summary prospectus filed as form 497K
with the SEC. Prior to 2009, funds used several forms so we perform the search on forms 497K1, 497K2, 497K3A, and 497K3B. We generate an indicator variable equal to one if a fund uses the quantitative investing terms in its prospectus and zero otherwise (Quant). We also collect information on the ticker(s) from the prospectus as well as the company name, CIK number, and the filing date. We categorize funds that are not identified as quantitative by the methodology as "fundamental" or "non-quantitative" funds.
Our method of categorizing funds is most similar to Harvey et al. statement. This is written for every OE, CE, and VA fund in the Morningstar universe and is pulled from the most recent SEC filing (prospectus or supplement)."
We focus on the Investment Strategy from the fund's prospectus and reported by Morningstar Direct to generate our phrase list.
One major difference is that our methodology generates more identifying language than Harvey et al. (2017) and focuses on the use of phrases instead of individual words. We also utilize documentation provided directly by the fund rather than data hosted by secondary providers. The reasoning for these decisions is two-fold, first by using a larger list of identifying language we are better able to identify funds as quantitative and decrease the risk of misidentifying funds as nonquantitative which would lead to Type II errors 5 .
We also choose to use phrases rather than individual words to mitigate the possibility of misidentifying funds as quantitative on the basis of commonly used words in the prospectus. In particular key words of interest can have ambiguous meaning in the context of investment management (i.e. "quantitative") and thus relying on phrases decreases the probability of committing a Type I error. 6 Also, unlike Harvey et al. (2017) we consider the entirety of the documentation provided directly from the fund rather than relying on the data provided by an intermediary. Our belief is that it is unclear if the Investment Strategy section on Morningstar adequately and regularly captures pertinent information even for the portion of the prospectus detailing how the fund invests. By considering the entirety of the document we do not omit any information from consideration which decreases the likelihood of committing a Type I error. 5 Over identification resulting from the use of the word "quantitative" may cause funds that use simple value screens to be identified as quantitative funds. Often these screens are described as a "quantitative screen" and it is possible that fundamental funds of that type exhibit behavior more reflective of their fundamental investing style than a quantitative methodology. Results from these falsely identified funds may be significant but would be incorrectly attributed to a quantitative investing style thereby committing a Type II error of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis. 6 If non-quantitative funds are falsely identified as quantitative funds in the sample differences between the fund types would be expected to be minimal meaning that we are more likely to accept a null hypothesis of no differences between fund types.
Like Albina (2017) the bulk of the phrases utilize "quantitative" 7 and thus its root is a primary means of identification. Our inclusion of "quantitative" generally agrees with results from the random forest algorithm utilized in her setting which finds the "quantit-" word root to be the most important for the identification of quantitative funds. Albina (2017) also relies on identification performed by examining prospectuses hosted on the EDGAR database. We also examine fund names on CRSP and look for those containing "quantitative" in the name and categorize those as quantitative funds which Albina (2017) uses as a complimentary means of identification. In comparison to her sample we have identified fewer funds but are also confident that the methodology is robust to misidentification in either direction as it requires one of the phrases in the list to be used precisely and will not identify simply for the use of the word "quantitative."
Mutual fund and holdings data
Once we have identified quantitative funds we match the funds to the CRSP Survivor-BiasFree US Mutual Fund Database sample of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds operating between 2000 and 2015. CRSP provides data on fund net assets, returns, and other characteristics. We focus our analysis on funds with designated CRSP investment objectives of mid-cap, small-cap, micro-cap, growth, growth and income, and equity income. ETFs, variable annuities, and index funds are dropped from the sample using CRSP flags and name searches.
Mutual fund holdings data comes from Thomson Reuters and is merged to the CRSP database via the MFLINKS table. These holdings are then merged with the CRSP stock database to obtain returns and other relevant characteristics. To be included in the tests, a mutual fund must hold at least twenty CRSP-merged stocks on a report date. We apply the filters used in Frazzini (2006) to the Thomson Reuters data to exclude observations that appear to be errors. Additionally, holdings are set to "missing" when the number of shares a fund holds is greater than the number of shares outstanding for that stock or the value of the position is greater than the fund's total asset value. Fund characteristics and returns from CRSP are aggregated across share classes on an asset-weighted basis using the WFICN variable from the MFLINKS table. The oldest available share class is used to compute fund age. CRSP returns are net of fees, expenses and brokerage commissions but before any front-end or back-end loading fees. Net fund returns are converted to excess returns by subtracting the corresponding risk-free rate. Monthly return data for the market (MKT_RF), size (SMB), value (HML), momentum (MOM), investment (CMA), and profitability (RMW) factors were retrieved from Kenneth French's website. 8 We include information on fund factor exposures generated by a 6-factor model which includes factors from both Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (2015) . 9 The coefficients are estimated using fund returns and factor data from the prior 24 months. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we calculate monthly net fund flows using net asset and return data. Flows consist of the monthly growth in net assets not attributable to returns and are calculated as: Additionally quantitative funds tend to have a lower standard deviation of these coefficients indicating that these funds are operating using similar signals. The higher reliance on known anomalies and lower standard deviation of coefficients implies quantitative funds are more homogenous compared to their non-quantitative counterparts. Greater differences between the two types are found in other fund level characteristics. Specifically we find that on average, quantitative funds tend to have experienced lower net flows, and exhibit both greater turnover and lower expense ratios than non-quantitative funds. Of particular note, given our findings on the larger distortions created by quantitative funds, we find that quantitative funds are smaller than their non-quantitative peers. The difference is size alone indicates that the larger distortion is not merely a mechanical byproduct of a large fund selling off a sizeable portion of its assets.
Later in the paper we use a number of additional variables as controls. We follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and consider the following stock level variables: natural log of market capitalization, firm age, dividend yield, book-to-market ratio, share price, turnover, volatility, the stock's return over the previous three months, and the stock's return over the nine months preceding the prior quarter. We also add investment and profitability as calculated in Fama and French (2015) . See Appendix A for further detail on variable construction.
Do Quantitative and Non-Quantitative Mutual Fund Fire Sales Differ?
In this section we examine whether quantitative fire sales have a differential impact on stock prices than non-quantitative fire sales. We begin by measuring the difference in the performance of securities sold by quantitative and non-quantitative funds during a fire sale. We follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and label funds with the largest net outflows, and their associated stocks, as experiencing a fire sale. We find that fire sale stocks sold by quantitative funds experience a 100 basis point greater decline than those from a non-quantitative funds. Additionally, we find that the amount of time it takes these stocks to recover to their fundamental value is significantly longer than non-quantitative funds.
Identifying fire sale stocks
We use quarterly mutual fund flows to identify stocks with significant downward pressure due to liquidity based trading by mutual funds.
10 To perform this identification of "pressure stocks," we follow Coval and Stafford (2007) 
We observe much more variation in the NonQuantpressure variable than QuantPressure in our sample. The increased variation for NonQuantPressure is not surprising given there are more non-quantitative funds than quantitative funds. However, despite fewer shares sold or purchased by quantitative funds we still find that their effect is much larger. This unexplained larger effect implies that something besides the total dollar amount traded leads to the larger distortions generated by quantitative funds.
Quantitative fire sales: portfolio sorts
We examine the outcomes for stocks sold by each fund type during fire sales. To do so we again follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and in each of the 56 event quarters, we sort stocks by QuantPressure and NonQuantPressure. In particular, we identify stocks in the top and bottom deciles for each pressure measure and label stocks in these top and bottom deciles "pressure stocks." Stocks in the top decile have upward price pressure meaning that they are being purchased by the funds receiving net inflows. Conversely those in the lowest decile are those that are being most heavily sold due to outflows. Table 2 presents summary statistics information on pressure stocks held by both fund types.
Insert Table 2 About Here Panel A presents the characteristics of stocks undergoing high and low levels of pressure from quantitative funds' trades. While Panel B presents characteristics of high and low pressure stocks for non-quantitative funds. We consider a combination of variables associated with firm level stock returns including age, size, trailing returns, return volatility, investment and profitability. In general, the information in Table 2 indicates that quantitative pressure stocks tend to have similar characteristics when compared to non-quantitative pressure stocks. This suggests that any differences in the effects of fire sale trading for each type of fund would likely stem from something besides stock level considerations. There are some modest differences between the groups. For example, stocks undergoing quantitative fund selling pressure tend to be more growthoriented relative to stocks undergoing selling pressure from non-quantitative funds. To ensure that the results are not driven by firm level characteristics, we later conduct a set of multivariate regressions on abnormal returns which control for these stock level characteristics.
To perform a preliminary analysis of the effect flow induced selling pressure has on stock returns, we form equally weighted portfolios consisting of the low pressure stocks (both quantitative and non-quantitative) in each event quarter. Daily abnormal portfolio returns are computed using a 6-factor model which includes the Fama and French (2015) five factors plus momentum. We choose to include the momentum factor from Carhart (1997) due to findings from Lou (2012) that flow based trading induces momentum in stock returns. Additionally, we use daily returns rather than monthly returns to more accurately estimate factor loadings for individual securities at the time the fire sale occurs.
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Portfolio betas are estimated using a window from minus 250 days to minus 22 days and daily portfolio abnormal returns are computed using the following model:
Where , e i t r is portfolio l's return in excess of the risk-free rate on day t. The model's benchmark returns for each portfolio are calculated using beta coefficient estimates from the estimation window and time t factor realizations. These are then subtracted from the portfolio's realized excess returns to form the daily abnormal returns. To reduce the impact of idiosyncratic market days we further average the daily abnormal portfolio returns over the 56 quarters. Our calculation methodology generates daily average abnormal returns. Finally, we sum the daily average abnormal portfolio returns over the event quarter and subsequent quarters to obtain cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for the portfolios of quantitative and non-quantitative fire sales stocks. By removing return variation driven by factor exposure we isolate the effect of the fire sale on the stock return. We find that the magnitude of abnormal returns for a portfolio of stocks that are heavily sold by quantitative mutual funds is substantially more negative than the abnormal returns realized by the portfolio of stocks heavily sold by non-quantitative funds. Further, we observe that the difference between the security types is not trivial. During the event quarter, the quantitative fire sale stock portfolio CARs are nearly 100 basis points less than the non-quantitative fire sale stock portfolio.
Moreover, we find that time it takes for the portfolio of quantitative fund stocks to return to fundamental value is more delayed, taking approximately 80 more trading days on average. Simply put not only do securities sold by quantitative funds experience a large deviation from fundamental value, it takes these securities significantly longer to recover.
It is not obvious why the size of the distortion and delay is so much larger for quantitative stocks. However these large differences provide initial compelling evidence that quantitative funds have a greater impact on market stability. To confirm that stock level characteristics are not driving the difference we employ a multivariate regression framework in Section 2.3
Quantitative fire sales: multivariate regression analyses
The findings in Section 2.2 indicate that on average quantitative fund fire sales generate larger market distortions and these distortions take longer to recover from. However, Table 2 indicates that this may be driven by minor differences in firm level characteristics of the stocks sold by each fund type. To account for these differences we use a panel OLS regression framework with stock level controls and thus mitigate any confounding effect. Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates from regressions of cumulative abnormal stock returns observed over the course of the fire sale event quarter on both contemporaneous quantitative pressure and non-quantitative pressure. The cumulative abnormal returns for individual stocks are computed using the same estimation procedure used for the portfolio analyses described in Section 2.2. As before stocks must be held by at least 10 mutual funds to enter the sample. Each regression includes quarter fixed effects to account for variation attributable to macroeconomic and market environment. We also follow guidance from Peterson (2009) and cluster standard errors at the stock and quarter level. Finally, we use t-tests to determine if the coefficient estimates on quantitative and non-quantitative pressure in each column are statistically different from one another. Our testing methodology allows us to evaluate how significant the pressure from each fund type is in driving abnormal returns.
Insert Table 3 About Here We begin by estimating coefficients for QuantPressure and NonQuantPressure in column (1) prior to adding covariates to the model. In column (2) we add each stock's total ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding) by quantitative and non-quantitative funds as a possible explanatory variable. Column (3) includes a vector of stock characteristic control variables following both Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Fama and French (2015) . Doing so ensures that the observed effect is not driven by the slight differences in firm level characteristics as observed in Table 2 .
The results in all three columns provide show that quantitative fund pressure has an economically larger impact on stock returns during the fire sale event window compared to nonquantitative fund pressure. The coefficients for both quantitative and non-quantitative fund pressure are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the magnitude of the coefficient on quantitative fund pressure is larger. A t-test of the coefficients yields that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in all three models.
In column (3), the magnitude of the pressure coefficient quantitative funds is over five times larger (0.497) than the coefficient for non-quantitative funds (0.091). The economic interpretation of these coefficients is straightforward, a 1% decrease in stock ownership from a quantitative fund undergoing a fire sale is associated with a 4.97% decrease in abnormal stock returns over the event quarter while a 1% decrease in stock ownership from a non-quantitative fund undergoing a fire sale is associated with a 0.91% decrease in abnormal returns during the quarter. Given the economically large difference in magnitudes between the quantitative and nonquantitative funds the natural next question is why does there exist such a large effect for quantitative funds relative to non-quantitative funds?
What Drives Quant Funds' Larger Impact?
The results in Section 2 demonstrate that fire sales from quantitative funds generate larger distortions than fire sales by non-quantitative funds. In this section we test three potential mechanisms that could drive the result. First, if quantitative funds approach the investment process in a similar manner, they are more likely to hold and trade the same securities and exert more pressure as they exit these positions. Second, quantitative funds may be more likely to consider similar stock characteristics when choosing which securities to liquidate in their portfolios. In particular, we focus on negative security price momentum since momentum is a common quantitative fund strategy and it may be that a fire sale by one fund generates negative momentum leading other quantitative funds to liquidate their positions. Third, quantitative funds may systematically hold different levels of cash than non-quantitative funds. All else being equal, funds that hold less cash would have to sell a greater quantity of securities to meet investor redemptions for the same level of fund flows during a fire sale. This could potentially generate greater downward pressure on prices. The result support the overlapping positions and momentum hypothesis but not the cash level mechanism.
Portfolio and trading overlap
We start by exploring overlapping portfolio holdings and trading activities of funds undergoing fire sales during the sample period. Table 1 Insert Table 4 About Here
In column (1) of Panel A, we find that quantitative fund pairs have average portfolio overlap of 8.12%. This is significantly larger than non-quantitative funds whose average portfolio overlap is shown to be 5.56% in column (2). We use a t-test to determine whether these means are statistically significantly different from each other. Quantitative fund overlap is found to be larger and the difference between like fund overlap for each fund type is statistically significant at the 1% level. In Columns (3) and (4), we find that results are more pronounced when measuring portfolio overlap using the number of stocks held in common. The results show that quantitative fund pairs hold more than twice as many common positions relative to non-quantitative fund pairs (14.84 versus 6.13).
Panel B examines sell overlap between all three types of fund pairs. Columns (1) and (2) show that fire sale quantitative fund pairs have significantly greater overlap in their selling activity than their non-quantitative fund counterparts. We find that quantitative funds have nearly 50%
greater overlap (10.17% versus 6.92%) in their selling activity on average. As in Panel A, we find that the results are most pronounced when examining selling activity as the number of common stocks sold. Columns (3) and (4) show that quantitative fund pairs have more than twice as many common sales (6.07 versus 2.74) as compared to their non-quantitative fund counterparts. T-tests
show that the differences in selling and portfolio overlap are significant at better than the 1% level.
Taken together, the results in Table 4 
The role of security returns and characteristics in the liquidation decision
Prior tests on the heightened factor exposures and common trades/holdings for quantitative funds suggest that they may undertake similar processes when choosing which securities to liquidate in their portfolios. Among other factors, momentum is a common trading strategy for quantitative funds. A potential contributing explanation for our results is that the larger distortion is caused by negative price momentum. Prior literature shows that mutual fund flows induce subsequent price momentum in stocks (Warther (1995) and Lou (2012) We test if quantitative funds are more sensitive to past returns and other stock characteristics in their selling decisions in Table 5 .
Insert Table 5 About Here This table presents Table 3 , and include stock returns over the prior quarter (Rett-1) and stock returns over the three quarters preceding the prior quarter (Rett-2,t-4). For the negative momentum feedback loop hypothesis, we would expect that quantitative funds would be particularly sensitive to recent returns (e.g., over the past quarter) and not necessarily as sensitive to returns realized over time periods further in the past.
Columns (1) and (2) Consistent with the idea that quantitative funds rely heavily on stock characteristics in their selling decisions, we find that the adjusted R 2 from the sell regression for quantitative funds in column (1) is more than three times larger (7.5%) than the adjusted R 2 from the sell regression for non-quantitative funds (1.9%) in column (2). We find significant differences in many of the coefficients for quantitative and non-quantitative funds in column (5). For example, quantitative funds are more likely to sell the larger and arguably more liquid stocks in their portfolios relative to non-quantitative funds. Moreover, we find evidence consistent with our negative momentum hypothesis. Specifically, the coefficient on prior quarter returns for quantitative funds is significantly more negative than the coefficient on past quarter returns for non-quantitative funds (-0.084 versus -0.039). Column (5) shows that this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, we find no clear relationship between quantitative and non-quantitative funds' decisions to sell securities based on returns that are realized further in the past (i.e., the coefficients on
Rett-2,t-4).
Overall, the results in Table 5 demonstrate that quantitative funds operate differently during fire sales than non-quantitative funds and provide evidence that the negative momentum hypothesis contributes the larger distortion from quantitative funds. We find that quantitative funds are more significantly more sensitive to past recent returns. This heightened sensitivity to recent past returns opens the possibility that the securities they liquidate are more likely to enter a negative feedback loop whereby other quantitative funds undergoing liquidity-based sales choose to sell the same securities.
Differences in cash holdings
We 12 Funds undergoing extreme inflows that have high levels of cash arguably have more urgency to put cash to use.
Insert Table 6 About Here
We find that the results remain economically and statistically similar to the baseline results.
Interestingly, we find that the coefficient on NonQuantPressure is relatively unchanged from the baseline specification even when focusing on funds with relatively disadvantaged levels of cash.
This suggests that the findings are likely not driven by systematic differences in the levels of cash between the two types of funds.
Robustness Checks
This section focuses on robustness checks of the main results. First, we consider whether crisis periods either for quantitative managers or for the broader financial market are driving our results. Crisis periods are often marked with significant withdrawals from mutual funds and negative returns in broader capital markets. In particular, quantitative funds experienced a crisis in 2007 known as the "Quant Crisis" (or "Quant Quake") that was marked with losses for a number of major quantitative hedge funds (Kirilenko and Lo (2013)). It is possible that this and the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 drive our results. We also consider a robustness test of our identification methodology and the specifications of our main results in Table 3 . We find that the results are stronger in crisis periods but not driven by these time periods. We also find the results are robust to our decisions in the categorization of funds and to tweaks in specification.
The "quant meltdown" and financial crisis
We first consider how crisis periods may impact the findings. Specifically, we test if the baseline results are primarily driven by crisis periods in the sample. We consider calendar years which include both the quant crisis and the financial crisis. The "Quant Meltdown" (or "Quant Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 retabulate the baseline multivariate results using crisis and non-crisis subsample periods.
Insert Table 7 In column (2), during the crisis years, we find that the magnitudes of the coefficients on both QuantPressure and NonQuantPressure increase more than twofold. Specifically, we note that the coefficient on QuantPressure increases to 0.952 and the coefficient on NonQuantPressure increases to 0.206. While the coefficients are larger for both types of funds we curiously note that the coefficient on QuantPressure retains a similar relative magnitude compared to NonQuantPressure as it is more than four times larger. Overall, the findings are consistent with quantitative funds' greater impact on markets being realized across all types of market conditions.
Harvey et al. (2017) quantitative classifications, Fama-MacBeth specification, and alternate abnormal return calculations
We first consider a test of the quantitative fund identification by approximating Harvey et al. (2017)'s identification methodology in our setting. Importantly, though there is minor overlap in the language used in both our and Harvey et al. (2017)'s identifying phrase lists they are sufficiently orthogonal to each other. This is unsurprising given that the documentation requirements and audience is sufficiently different in their setting compared to ours. However, these differences are merely cosmetic and Harvey et al (2017)'s phrase list provides a natural means of robustness testing our identification and findings.
We first perform a search on the Morningstar Direct database for all funds categorized as "Equity" using the Global Broad Category Group filter while also requiring that the fund is not an index fund, is the oldest share class of the fund, and that the base currency is the U.S. Dollar.
This produces a list of 12,823 funds for review. We collect information on the Investment Strategy, Ticker, and FundID. Next we scrape the Investment Strategy field using the word list from Harvey et al. (2017) 14 to identify quantitative mutual funds. We use this alternative means of identification as a final robustness tests of our results.
Column (4) of Table 7 retabulates the baseline results using the Harvey et al. (2017) classifications of quantitative and non-quantitative funds. Specifically, we rerun the multivariate panel regression in column (3) of Table 3 . Given that Harvey et al (2017)'s phrase list includes fewer words it is not surprising that we identify fewer quantitative funds in the sample. Moreover, since we require at least 75 quant funds report in a given quarter to calculate the pressure variables, this analysis only uses 52 calendar quarters as opposed to the 56 calendar quarters in the baseline tests. This explains the lower number observations in this specification relative to the baseline analyses.
We document a similar effect from quantitative funds fire sales relative to non-quantitative fire sales when using the Harvey et al. (2017) classification. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on QuantPressure in column (4) of Table 7 is nearly four times as large as the coefficient on NonQuantPressure and these coefficients are different at the 10% level. These results speak to the robustness of the findings with respect to decisions made in the classification process.
Finally, for robustness, we also tabulate the base line regression in Table 3 using FamaMacBeth regression in column (5) of Table 7 . We also use alternate methods for computing abnormal returns. In column (6), we estimate abnormal returns using the market model as opposed to a 6-factor model. In column (7), we use monthly returns instead of daily returns to estimate betas and compute quarterly CARs. Specifically, in column (7) we use a (-36, -2) month window to estimate betas and cumulate the monthly abnormal returns over the quarterly event window. We find that our inferences remained unchanged with these changes in methodologies.
Conclusion
This 
Pressure stocks CRSP Mutual Fund and Stock Databases
Stocks in the bottom/top deciles of the above pressure measures in a given calendar quarter.
Portfolio overlap Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings
The percentage overlap of two funds' portfolio holdings computed as:
, ,
where wh,k,t is fund h's weight (as a fraction total portfolio market value) in stock k in quarter t.
Sale overlap Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings
The percentage of overlapping trades (measured in stock names) made by two funds in a given quarter, computed as:
min ,
min , Where I -is an indicator variable equal to 1 if fund h or j reduces its number of shares in stock k during the quarter.
Sell
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings
Indicator variable equal to one if the number shares the fund holds for a given stock has declined since the prior report date and zero otherwise. The 6-factor model consists of the market (Mkt-Rf) factor, size (SMB), value (HML), momentum (MOM) investment (CMA) and profitability (RMW) factors. Factor loadings are estimated using fund and factor returns over the previous 24 months.
Stock Characteristic Controls

Fund Family TNA CRSP Mutual Fund Database
Aggregate fund family total net assets. Fund families are identified in CRSP using the MGMT_CD variable.
Fund age CRSP Mutual Fund Database
Number of years (months/12) between the current month and the month the fund's oldest share class was first offered in CRSP (first_offer_dt). 
Fund turnover CRSP Mutual Fund Database
The fund's lagged annual portfolio turnover. Turnover is TNA weighted across share classes in CRSP using the WFICN variable.
Expense CRSP Mutual Fund Database
The fund's lagged annual expense ratio. The fund's expense ratio is TNA weighted across share classes in CRSP using the WFICN variable. Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Fama and French (2015) . Each regression includes event quarter fixed effects and standard errors are double clustered on stock and quarter. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. Fama-French (2015) fivefactor model plus momentum. This six factor model is estimated using daily returns and a (-250,-22) window.
As controls, we also include measures of lagged ownership for both fund types (QuantOwnership and NonQuantOwnership). See Appendix A for further detail on variable construction. All columns use quarter fixed effects. Column 3 adds lagged stock level controls following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Fama and French (2015) . Each regression includes event quarter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered on stock and quarter. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
